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ABSTRACT
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). A key motivation behind the passage
of this bill was to preserve the confidentiality of an individual's
protected health information. To accomplish this aim, Congress
empowered the Department of Health and Human Services to
promulgate regulations governing when and to what extent an
individual's health information may be disclosed These
regulations become collectively known as the Privacy Rule and
carry severe penalties for their violation. Since its compliance date
of April 14, 2003, numerous concerns have arisen regarding the
efficacy and implications of the Rule. This article addresses the
following four questions: 1) whether the Privacy Rule is actually
being enforced, 2) whether the Department of Justice is
empowered to prosecute individuals, not just covered entities, for
violations of the Rule, 3) the extent to which the Privacy Rule
protects genetic information and its implications for the future of
genetic privacy, and 4) how the Privacy Rule interacts with other
federal and state laws addressing the privacy of health
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
A key motivation behind the passage of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was to preserve
the confidentiality of an individual's protected health information.
Through HIPAA, Congress empowered the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations governing how, when, and
to what extent private health information may be disclosed. These
regulations, known collectively as the Privacy Rule, had a compliance
date of April 14, 2003 for most covered entities and since that date,
numerous questions and concerns have arisen concerning the Rule's
scope, interpretation, and implications.' This article will address the
following: 1) whether the Privacy Rule is actually being enforced, 2)
whether the Department of Justice is empowered to prosecute
individuals, not just covered entities, for violations of the Privacy
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1 Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2005).
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Rule, 3) the extent to which the Privacy Rule protects genetic
information and its implications for the future of genetic privacy, and
4) how the Privacy Rule interacts with other federal and state laws
addressing the privacy of health information.
II. HIPAA: A BEGINNER'S GUIDE
A. WHY WAS HIPAA ENACTED?
HIPAA2 was enacted to reduce the monetary cost of administrative
operations in the health care industry and to simplify the exchange of
electronic health information, with particular focus on preventing
fraud and unauthorized access to, and disclosure of, individually
identifiable health information. 3 To accomplish this goal, Congress
incorporated into HIPAA sections 261 through 264, known
collectively as the "Administrative Simplification" provisions. These
provisions empower HHS to create and publish rules to streamline the
electronic exchange of health information.4 At the same time,
Congress recognized that advances in electronic technology could
seriously threaten patient privacy, and included in the Administrative
Simplification provisions explicit authority for HHS to adopt rules to
protect the confidentiality of individually identifiable health
information.
B. WHAT IS A COVERED ENTITY?
HIPAA applies to three particular categories of persons, known as
"covered entities." Section 1172(a) of the statute reads, in relevant
part, "any standard adopted under this part shall apply, in whole or in
part, to the following persons: ... 1. a health plan... 2. a health care
clearinghouse ... 3. a health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction
2 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191,110 Stat. 1936 (1996), http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl 104191 .htm.
3 Id. pmbl.
4 HIPAA § 1173.
5HIPAA § 264.
6 HIPAA § 1172.
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referred to in section 1173(al (1)." 7  Each of the three entities is
defined in detail in the statute. If an entity is not a covered entity as
defined in the statute, it is presumably not required to comply with the
Administrative Simplification provisions or any regulations
promulgated there under by HHS.
Ascertaining whether an entity is covered by HIPAA can be a
vexing determination, particularly because the language of the statute
is so complex. There are numerous resources available online that can
assist an entity in determining whether it is covered, including a
"Covered Entity Decision Tool" provided by the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services.
9
C. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION PROVISIONS
HIPAA's Administrative Simplification provisions are divided into
four sections: 1) Electronic Transactions and Code Sets, 2) Unique
Identifiers, 3) Security, and 4) Privacy. Each of these four provisions is
activated when HHS issues a final set of regulations, known as a final
rule. 10 Each final rule will list a particular compliance date (these
dates are different for each provision because HHS releases final
regulations as they are developed) by which covered entities must
meet the rules' requirements.
1. TRANSACTIONS AND CODE SETS
In the past, the health care industry, including health care providers
and insurance plans, used different electronic formats and definitions
of data elements to process medical claims. As a result, data had to be
7 HIPAA § 1 173(a)(1): The Secretary shall adopt standards for transactions, and data elements
for such transactions, to enable health information to be exchanged electronically, that are
appropriate for- (A) the financial and administrative transactions described in paragraph (2);
and (B) other financial and administrative transactions determined appropriate by the
Secretary, consistent with the goals of improving the operation of the health care system and
reducing administrative costs.
8 For definitions of: "health plan," see HIPAA § 1171(5); "health care clearinghouse," see
HIPAA § 1171(2); "health care provider," see HIPAA § 1171(3).
9 The Covered Entity Decision Tool may be accessed at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/
hipaa2/support/tools/decisionsupport/default.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). See also
http://www.hipaacomply.com/coveredentityfaq.htm (last visited Feb. 21,2005).
10 HIPAA Primer, at http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/HIPAAprimer.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
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reformatted and recoded before it could be shared, resulting in high
administrative costs. By ordering a standardized transaction and code
system, Congress intended to reduce handling and processing time, to
improve data quality, and to decrease administrative costs.
Section 1173(a)(1) of HIPAA states that "the Secretary [of HHS]
shall adopt standards for transactions, and data elements for such
transactions, to enable health information to be exchanged
electronically."" On April 17, 2000, HHS released the final rule
governing electronic transactions and code sets. 12 Compliance with
this rule was required by October 16, 2002 for large health plans,
health care providers, and health care clearinghouses, while small
health plans had until October 16, 2003 to comply. However, in
December 2001, Congress enacted the Administrative Simplification
Compliance Act (ASCA), 14 which granted a one-year compliance
extension to October 16, 2003. In February 2003 HHS modified the
final rule, 15 but the compliance date of October 16, 2003 for all
covered entities was unchanged.
1 6
2. IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS
As was the case with transactions and code sets, the health care
industry used multiple identification formats when engaging in
business transactions with each other. For example, employers often
used different identifiers (for example, a health care provider, patient,
or patient's employer might be referred to by several different names:
John Doe, John J. Doe, John Doe Jr., etc.) when communicating with
H HIPAA § 1173(a)(1).
1245 C.F.R. §§ 160 and 162 (2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaa2/regulations/
transactions/finalrule/txfinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
13 A "small health plan" is a health plan with annual receipts of $5 million or less. 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.103.
14 Administrative Simplification Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 107-105, 115 Stat. 1003 (2001),
http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/regsinPDF/asca.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
15 Health Insurance Reform: Modifications to Electronic Data Transaction Standards and Code
Sets, 68 Fed. Reg. 8381 (Feb. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 162), at
http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/finaltransmod/finaltransmod.txt (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
16 For more information on the transaction and code sets rule, see
http://www.hipaadvisory.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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health plans, which was inefficient and confusing. In section
1173(b)(1) of HIPAA, Congress authorized HHS to adopt standard
unique health identifiers for every individual, employer, health plan
and health care provider participating in the health care system,'
which are intended to reduce errors and administrative costs.' 8
HHS published the final rule on January 23, 2004.19 The effective
date of the rule is May 23, 2005, with a compliance deadline of May
23, 2007 (May 23, 2008 for small health plans). After that date, any
covered entity that transmits health information in electronic format
must comply with this rule.
20
3. SECURITY STANDARDS
While a main goal of HIPAA's Administrative Simplification
provisions is to reduce errors and administrative costs, Congress was
also concerned with the security of electronically transmitted health
data. Section 1173(d) of those provisions empowers HHS to adopt
regulations to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of electronic
protected health information. 2
1
The final security standards were published on February 20, 2003
with an effective date of April 21, 2003 .22 The final rule requires
covered entities to take certain precautions to secure health
information created, received, maintained, or transmitted by that entity
and to protect against reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the
security of certain protected health information. 23 The rule requires
that adequate security measures be in place to protect networks,
computers, and other electronic devices used in transmitting or storing
17 HIPAA of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-191, § 1173(b)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2025 (1996).
1845 C.F.R. § 162 (2005), http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar200i0800/
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/04-1149.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
'
9 1d.
20 For more information on the identification standards, see http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
hipaa/hipaa2/regulations/identifiers/default.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). See also
www.hipaadvisory.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
21 HIPAA § 1173(d).
" 45 C.F.R. § 164, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/hipaa2/regulations/security/03-3877.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
23 HIPAA Primer, supra note 10.
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electronic protected health information. 24 For example, individuals
must be assigned unique passwords in order to access confidential
information electronically, and the system must keep a record of, who
viewed what information so that it is possible to check whether all
individuals who accessed a specific record had an appropriate need to
know. Most covered entities will have until April 21, 2005 to comply
with the security standards (April 21, 2006 for small health plans).25
4. THE PRIVACY RULE
Section 264 of the Administrative Simplification provisions
authorizes HHS to promulgate privacy regulations for individually
identifiable health information (IIHI), also known as protected health
information, or PHI, used by covered entities. The final regulations
would become known as the "Privacy Rule."
A primary goal of the Privacy Rule is to "define and limit the
circumstances in which an individual's protected health information
may be used or disclosed by covered entities." 26 IHI is a subset of
health information that either identifies the individual, or provides a
reasonable probability that the information could be used to identify
the individual.27 Examples of IIHI range from the obvious like name,
address, birthdate, and social security number to less obvious
information like a credit card number, telephone number, or even the
name of an individual's obstetrician.
The Privacy Rule contains several provisions of particular interest
to patients and health care providers. The Rule protects an individual's
right to access his or her protected health information 28 by dictating
that a covered entity must allow individuals "access to inspect and
obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual. 29
24 Id
25 For more information on the Security Rule, see http://www.hipaadvisory.com (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
26 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUMMARY OF THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 4 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
27 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
28 For a definition of "protected health information," see 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.
29 45 C.F.R. §164.524.
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The Rule directs covered entities to provide a notice of privacy
practices to patients so they understand "the uses and disclosures of
protected health information that may be made by the covered entity..
. and the covered entity's legal duties with respect to protected health
information." 30 The Privacy Rule requires covered entities to adhere to
a minimum necessary standard when disclosing protected health
information. 3 1 "Minimum necessary" means that when disclosing
protected health information, a covered entity must make "reasonable
efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum necessary
to accom2plish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or
request."
Of particular interest to covered entities are the administrative
regulations contained within the Privacy Rule. Among other
requirements, these provisions mandate that a covered entity train all
members of its workforce about protected health information, 33 that it
designate a privacy official responsible for the implementation of the
Privacy Rule,34 that it provide for sanctions against an employee who
fails to comply with the Privacy Rule, 35 and that a covered entity have
procedures for individuals to complain about any failure to adhere to
the Privacy Rule.
36
HHS published the Privacy Rule on December 28, 2000, with an
effective date of April 14, 2001. However, the rule was modified to
ensure that it functioned as intended, and in August 2002, HHS
adopted a modified final version of the Privacy Rule. By the
compliance date of April 14, 2003 (April 14, 2004 for small health
30 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a)(1). For more information on the notice requirement, see
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/guidelines/notice.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
31 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b).
32 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1). For more information on the minimum necessary standard, see
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/guidelines/minimurnecessary.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b)(1).
34 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(a)(1)(i).
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(e)(1).
36 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.530(a)(1)(ii) and (d)(l).
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plansl, covered entities must have fully implemented the Privacy
Rule.
5. ENFORCEMENT OF HIPAA's ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION
PROVISIONS
HIPAA's Administrative Simplification provisions authorize the
imposition of civil and criminal penalties (including jail time) for
failure to abide by the final rules adopted by HHS. Section 1176,
entitled "General Penalty for Failure to Comply with Requirements
and Standards," empowers the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to impose a penalty of not more than $100 per violation and
limits the total penalty that may be imposed on a person for all
violations of an identical requirement during a calendar year to not
more than $25,000. 38 HHS is responsible for assessing civil monetary
penalties for violations of the Administrative Simplification
provisions, while responsibility for investigation and enforcement of
the Privacy Rule in particular is assigned to the Office for Civil Rights
(OCR), a division of HHS.39
HIPAA specifically permits criminal penalties for "wrongful
disclosure of individually identifiable health information. ' 4° Section
1177 outlines a three-tiered punishment scale for "a person who
knowingly ... uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier [or]
obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an
individual or discloses individually identifiable health information to
another person."41 For the least serious violations, the individual may
be fined up to $50,000 and/or imprisoned for not more than one year.
If the offense is committed under false pretenses, the fine increases to
not more than $100,000 and/or not more than five years imprisonment.
But if the offense is committed for personal gain or malicious harm,
the penalty increases to a fine of not more than $250,000 and/or
37 45 C.F.R. § 164.534. For more information on the Privacy Rule, see the OCR website at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). See also http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/
privacysummary.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
38 HIPAA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1176, 110 Stat. 1936, 2028-29.
39 45 C.F.R. § 160.
40 HIPAA § 1177.
41 HIPAA § 1177(a).
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42imprisonment for not more than ten years. Congress delegated
criminal enforcement of HIPAA's Administrative Simplification
provisions to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).
III. IS THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCING THE PRIVACY RULE?
A. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ISSUE
As of July 31, 2004, the Office for Civil Rights had received and
initiated investigations of 7,577 complaints alleging violations of the
Privacy Rule. Fifty-seven percent of those cases were closed as of July
31 and over one hundred have been referred to the Department of
Justice as possible criminal violations.44 OCR estimates that it receives
over one hundred privacy-related complaints per week.45 Most of the
complaints involve 1) impermissible disclosure of health information,
2) absence of sufficient safeguards to prevent impermissible use of
health data, 3) failure to allow patients access to their medical records,
4) violations of the minimum necessary standard for disclosure of
health information, and 5) disclosure of health information without
proper authorization. 46 To date, OCR has not imposed any civil
monetary penalties.
B. WHY HASN'T THE OCR ASSESSED CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES?
OCR's enforcement strategy focuses on voluntary compliance and
education rather than punishment.47 On April 17, 2003, three days
before the Privacy Rule became effective, HHS issued the first
installment of an enforcement rule, which "establishes rules of
42 HIPAA § 1177(b).
43 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26.
44 Shannon Hartsfield, Health Law Alert: A HIPAA Wake-Up Call, HEALTH LAW 5 (Holland
+ Knight LLP), Aug. 24, 2004 at http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/
Newsletters.asp?IssuelD=488&Article=2676 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
45 Gregory Frost, Are the Enforcers Enforcing?, 6 ORTHOPEDIC TECH. REV. 7, 3 (Mar./Apr.
2004) at http://www.orthopedictechreview.com/issues/marapr04/pg4l.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
46 Hartsfield, supra note 44.
4 45 C.F.R. § 160(11) (2005).
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procedure for the imposition, by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, of civil money penalties on entities that violate standards
adopted by the Secretary under the Administrative Simplification
provisions. ' '4 8 In its preamble, the rule states that the official approach
to violations and enforcement is to work cooperatively with covered
entities to obtain compliance voluntarily and informally before
pursuing formal enforcement.49 This suggests that OCR's strategy is to
educate first and penalize as a last resort. This interim enforcement
rule ceases to be in effect on September 16, 2005. Additional
enforcement rules are forthcoming.
50
In 2004, OCR Director Richard Campanelli emphasized this
cooperative approach, stating that it "has always been, and continues
to be, that the most effective means of obtaining compliance is through
voluntary compliance."'5 1 Campanelli further explained that when
allegations of a privacy rule violation surface, OCR "get[s] in touch
with 'the covered entity' and let[s] them know the allegation. If it's
true, quickly the covered entity comes into compliance with the rule
and it is an opportunity for us to educate."
52
In 2003, Susan McAndrew, OCR's Senior Advisor for HIPAA
Privacy Policy, indicated that covered entities who may be in violation
of the Privacy Rule have been cooperative and responsive, making the
imposition of civil monetary penalties unnecessary. In a September
2003 speech, McAndrew asserted that "we haven't.., in the first five
months, had an occasion to [impose any fines]." She went on to say
that OCR would do so "only if we find a covered entity is
recalcitrant., 53 This comment suggests that to date, most covered
entities against whom there have been credible allegations of privacy
violations have satisfactorily addressed the problem to prevent future
infractions.
4 45 C.F.R. § 160.
49 id.
50 id.
51 Nina Youngstrom, OCR Chief Sees HIPAA Confusion Waning, But Complaints Persist,
REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE (Atlantic Info. Services, Inc., Washington, D.C.), June
2004, at http://www.aishealth.com/Compliance/Hipaa/
RMCConfusionWaningComplaints.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
52 Id.
53 Frost, supra note 45 8.
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OCR may have chosen not to impose civil monetary penalties to
date for violations of the Privacy Rule because it can only assign such
penalties under appropriate circumstances. Richard Campenelli
testified that Congress has only allowed HHS to impose civil penalties
if the covered entity "did not know, and by exercising reasonable
diligence would not have known, of the violation . . . . If failure to
comply was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect, and the
entity corrects the violation within thirty days of when it knew or
should have known of the error," OCR will not impose penalties.
54
A third consideration is that HHS has yet to release a finalized
version of the enforcement rule. The interim rule, which expires on
September 16, 2005, offers some temporary guidance, but until there is
a final rule, covered entities are not put on notice as to how HHS
intends to enforce its regulations. If OCR were to levy civil monetary
penalties for a violation of the Privacy Rule before a final enforcement
rule is published, they would in all likelihood be challenged in court
for lacking statutory authority. 55 Once a final version of the
enforcement rule is released, HHS would have the necessary statutory
authority to impose civil monetary fines, and covered entities would
have fair notice of what is expected of them. Until those guidelines are
released, OCR may be hesitant to impose penalties.
In assessing why OCR has not imposed any civil penalties, an
important consideration is the quality and legitimacy of the privacy
complaints that OCR has received. To date, OCR has rejected fifty-
five percent of privacy complaints for either lack of jurisdiction or, if
the allegations in the complaints were to be proven true, they still
would not constitute violations of the Privacy Rule.56 Some of the
complaints seem to result from a misunderstanding of the extent of
protection provided by the Privacy Rule. Candace Foster, HIPAA team
leader at Deaconess Hospital in Evansville, Indiana observes that
patients have a misperception that HIPAA "provides ironclad
54 HIPAA Medical Privacy and Transaction Rules: Overkill or Overdue? Before the Senate
Spec. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 25 (2003) (statement of Richard Campanelli, Director,
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services), at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/
testify/t030923.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
55 Ronald J. Levine et al., The Evolving Protections of HIPAA Regulations, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30,
2004. at 9.
56 Patty Enrado, More HIPAA Complaints to Come in 2005, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS, Oct. 2004,
at 5, at http://www.healthcareitnews.com/
NewsArticleView.aspx?ContentD=1648&ContentTypeID=-3&IssueID=l I (Last accessed on
2/20/05).
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guarantees of privacy at all times . . . . I hear people say 'this is in
violation of HIPAA' - but it's not."57 This large percentage of non-
actionable complaints helps explain why OCR has not imposed any
civil penalties to date.
While a large percentage of complaints are not actionable for lack
of jurisdiction or no violation, a number of complaints are filed
maliciously. According to the January 2005 "Report on Patient
Privacy," a monthly newsletter published by Atlantic Information
Services (AIS), "HIPAA has become the latest vehicle of catty and
even malicious patients and employees, who file phony privacy
complaints to hurt others," although the author cautions that "it's
unclear how widespread the phenomenon is.",58 Kelley Meeusen,
Health Information Compliance Coordinator and Privacy Officer at
Harrison Hospital in Bremerton, Washington, points out that of sixteen
privacy complaints that have been filed against it since April of 2003,
only four were found to be valid. In fact, the only complaint that
triggered an OCR investigation was found to be a phony privacy
complaint filed by a patient.
59
Attorney Leslie Bender confirms that some privacy complaints are
motivated, at least in part, by vengeful purposes. While assessing the
effectiveness of a Maryland hospital's HIPAA policies, Bender
discovered that angry employees threatened to file complaints with
OCR to force out a new manager. 60 According to Bender, during a
conversation with hospital employees about a new manager, one stated
that they "had HIPAA dirt on her and if she didn't get better at her job,
they'd file complaints with OCR and force her out."61 While the
legitimacy of these particular employees' complaints regarding
privacy violations is unknown, it seems that the Privacy Rule is being
used to wage personal vendettas and at least some of these complaints
are baseless.
57 Nina Youngstrorn, Some Patients and Employees Misuse HIPAA in Personal Attacks,
REPORT ON PATIENT PRIVACY (Atlantic Info. Services, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2005, at
http://www.aispub.com/Bnow/011905e.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
58 Id.
59 id.
60 id.
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C. A MOVE TOWARDS MORE AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT?
While OCR has not chosen to impose civil monetary penalties to
date, some legal experts believe that it is making a move towards more
visible enforcement. In a 2004 presentation before the Health Law
Section of the District of Columbia Bar, OCR Director Richard
Campanelli indicated that a number of both civil and criminal
complaints involving Privacy Rule violations are "in the pipeline" for
enforcement. 62 The number of complaints in the pipeline has been
estimated to be around sixty.63 Attorney Kirk J. Nahra of the Wiley
Rein & Fielding Privacy Practice predicts that while covered entities
generally make good faith efforts to come into compliance, "we can
expect more aggressive enforcement of rules over the next year '64 and
advises covered entities to "remain vigilant in their compliance
activities. '65  Gloria Steinberg of the Southern Healthcare
Administrative Regional Process (SHARP) and the Workgroup for
Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI) estimates that "once enough of
the final rules are released and all stakeholders become better educated
... a plethora of HIPAA complaints [will] be filed in 2005. ' '66
IV. DOJ "WARNING SHOT"? - UNITED STATES V. GIBSON67
A. CASE SUMMARY
In October 2003 phlebotomist Richard W. Gibson of SeaTac,
Washington impermissibly disclosed cancer patient Eric Drew's
individually identifiable health information to several credit card
companies to obtain four credit cards in Drew's name. Specifically,
62 Kirk J. Narha, A New Era for HIPAA Enforcement, PRIVACY IN Focus (Wiley Rein &
Fielding, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2004, at http://www.wrf.com/publications/
publication.asp?id=83556632004 (last Feb. 20, 2005).
63 Youngstrom, supra note 51.
64 Narha, supra note 62.
65 Id.
66 Enrado, supra note 56.
67 DOJ Complaint against Richard Gibson at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/waw/pressroom/
2004/aug/pdf files/cr04_0374rsm-inf.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
61 Id. at2.
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Gibson disclosed Drew's name, date of birth, and social security
number, all protected health information, which had been collected by
Gibson's employer, the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance, for payment of
health care services. 69 Gibson charged more than $9,000 for items
including "video games, home improvement supplies, apparel,
jewelry, porcelain figurines, groceries and gasoline. '' 70 After his
employer discovered that Gibson had abused his position to obtain and
misuse protected health information, he was fired.
The Department of Justice charged Gibson, as an individual, with
wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information
under 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d) (6) of HIPAA. The government and Gibson
entered into a plea agreement, which was accepted by the court.
Calling his actions "some of the most deplorable [behavior] I've seen
in 15 years on the bench,",7 1 on November 5, 2004, U.S. District Court
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez sentenced Gibson to sixteen months in
prison, four months longer than requested by the prosecution, and
ordered him to pay at least $15,000 in restitution in the first criminal
prosecution under HIPAA.72
The prosecution was unexpected to some because HIPAA
specifically states that it only applies to covered entities and not to
non-covered individuals like Gibson. HHS has consistently stated that
it is only permitted by statute to impose privacy standards on a covered
entity, "not business associates, not employers and not individuals who
are not themselves CEs. 73 Gibson presumably did not handle the
electronic transmission of protected health information and therefore
would not meet the definition of "health care provider" under HIPAA,
and would not be a covered entity within the meaning of the statute.
The decision to prosecute Gibson has led some to question the legality
of enforcing HIPAA against non-covered individuals and the
implications of doing so.
69 Id.
70 Gibson Plea Agreement at 6, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/waw/press-room/2004/
aug/pdf files/cr04_0374rsm_plea.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
71 Gene Johnson, Seattle Technician Sentenced in Identity Theft, THE COLUMBIAN, Nov. 6,
2004, at c2.
72 Id.
73 Nina Youngstrom, Are Individuals Covered by HIPAA? If So, What Would It Mean for
Covered Entities?, REPORT ON PATIENT PRIVACY (Atlantic Info. Services, Inc., Washington,
D.C.), Oct. 2004, at http://www.aishealth.com/Compliance/Hipaa/
RPPIndividualsHipaaCEs.html (last Feb. 21, 2005).
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B. DISCUSSION OF THE DOJ's DECISION TO PROSECUTE GIBSON UNDER
HIPAA
Why did the DOJ choose to prosecute Gibson under HIPAA when
it could have chosen any number of seemingly more appropriate
alternatives, such as identity theft or credit card fraud? HIPAA does
not carry a more severe punishment than other viable options, so the
choice does not seem to have been motivated by a desire to punish
more harshly. U.S. Attorney Public Affairs Officer Emily Langlie
explained that, "government lawyers examined the statutes that could
be brought against Gibson, and it was determined that the amount of
time served and penalties levied were similar whether it was tried
under HIPAA or under credit card fraud laws., 74 If HIPAA was not
selected because of a stiffer penalty, why charge Gibson under
HIPAA? Four factors seem to have influenced this decision: 1) a
connection to the health care industry, 2) an interest in deterring future
HIPAA violations, 3) a desire to put the health care industry on notice
that the DOJ will take HIPAA violations seriously, and 4) to indicate
that individuals, and not just covered entities, may be prosecuted for
violating HIPAA.
That Gibson acquired the health information in the course of his
duties as a health care technician caring for Drew seems to have
influenced the DOJ's decision to prosecute under HIPAA. In an
interview with Susan Loitz, Assistant District Attorney for the Western
District of Washington and one of the prosecutors of the Gibson case,
Loitz stated that the DOJ "could have charged Mr. Gibson with
unlawful identity theft, but the health care connection made it more
important that a HIPAA crime should be charged., 75 This statement
suggests that when HIPAA is an option among many, the DOJ may be
more inclined to prosecute under HIPAA rather than under another
statute.
A desire to deter future violations seems to have been a factor in
the decision to prosecute Gibson under HIPAA. Langlie indicated that
in deciding how to charge Gibson, "there is always an interest in
deterrence, and this is certainly a case that had more attention than it
74 Mike Scott, HIPAA Gavel Drops - A Message to Healthcare, RADIOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 22,
2004, at 38 at http://www.radiologytoday.net/archive/rt_1 12204p38.shtml (last Feb. 20, 2005).
75 Alan S. Goldberg, Interview with Susan Loitz, Assistant US. Attorney, ABA HEALTH
ESOURCE, Oct. 2004, at http://www.abanet.org/health/esource/vol 1 no2/ (Link to "more" for
rest of article) (Last accessed on 2/20/05).
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would have had it been tried under a different statute."7 6 The DOJ
seems to have chosen to prosecute under HIPAA with an eye towards
deterring similar misuse of protected health information by both
individuals and covered entities.
While deterrence may have been of significant interest to the DOJ,
some health care experts argue that the Gibson case is unlikely to deter
wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information by
individuals who are determined to do so. American Hospital
Association spokesperson Richard Wade stated, "I don't know
whether the law [HIPAA] will have much of a deterrent effect on
people who do that [wrongfully use individually identifiable health
information]. 77 Attorney Bruce Fried of Sonnenschein Nath &
Rosenthal agreed, saying that Gibson's actions are "the exact kind of
behavior HIPAA was intended to go after . . . [but] greedy, stupid
people will continue their scheme, even if a well-intentioned law is
aimed at deterring them."78 While deterring future HIPAA violations
may have been a factor in deciding to prosecute Gibson under HIPAA,
it is unclear whether the decision would in fact have the desired effect.
Numerous experts in health care law feel that a significant factor in
the decision to prosecute under HIPAA may have been a desire to
illustrate dramatically how seriously the government will take
violations. Health care attorney Brian Annulis of Michael Best &
Friedrich LLP, believes that the Gibson case is "the government's
strongest legal message yet concerning a HIPAA infraction .... This
was meant to send a ripple throughout the industry."79 Dan Rode, Vice
President for Policy and Government Relations for the American
Health Information Management Association, called the case a
"warning shot" from the government meant to attract the health care
industry's attention, which it has.
80
In addition to a desire to show how seriously the government will
take HIPAA violations, the choice to charge Gibson may have been
partially motivated by a desire to make clear that the DOJ will
prosecute individuals, not just covered entities. Kirk Nahra speculates
that, "there was some aspect of 'let's be first' in this effort by the
76 Scott, supra note 74.
77 Mark Taylor, HIPAA Violator Will Serve Time, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 15, 2004 at 17.
78 id.
79 Scott, supra note 74.
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Department of Justice, as well as making the point that individuals can
be prosecuted."81 Many assumed that covered entities, and not non-
covered individuals, would be prosecuted. Gibson showed that, at least
for now, this belief was incorrect.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GiBsoN CASE
The first criminal prosecution under HIPAA carries four
implications for the health care industry. First, it shows that the DOJ
intends to prosecute individuals, not just covered entities. Second, it
raises the question of whether covered entities will be held liable for
the transgressions of their employees. Third, it could be the beginning
of a trend by the DOJ towards more visible enforcement of HIPAA.
And finally, it indicates that the DOJ may choose to use HIPAA to
prosecute other crimes.
Before Gibson, many took for granted that HIPAA applied only to
covered entities. In a report published in November 2003 evaluating
HHS's interim enforcement rule, WEDI declared that criminal
violations only apply to an individual who, "knowingly and in
violation of the applicable part commits one of the offenses described
[and] . . . 'person' as defined in the HIPAA legislation is limited to
covered entities. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the criminal
penalties set forth in the HIPAA legislation can only be applied to
covered entities.' 82 Health care attorney Benjamin Butler of Crowell &
Moring agrees, reasoning that the law,
arguably applies only to "covered entities,".., who engage
in electronic HIPAA transactions, so that unauthorized
disclosures by others would not, by this interpretation, be
violations of HIPAA. By this reasoning, unless one is a
'covered entity,' it is not obvious how one can 'violate' this
part of the U.S. Code.8
3
SI Kirk J. Nahra, HIPAA Criminal Enforcement Starts (Aug. 20, 2004), at
http://www.wrf.com/publication.cfn?publicationid=8358 (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
82 WORKGROUP FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE (WEDI), STRATEGIC NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS (SNIP): HIPAA ENFORCEMENT RULE 5, at http://wedi.org/
cmsUploads/pdfUpload/WhitePaper/pub/Enforcement.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
83 Benjamin Butler, First Ever HIPAA Privacy Criminal Conviction, HEALTH CARE LAW IN
THE NEWS (Crowell & Morning LLP) 2004,, at http://www.crowell.com/Content/
Expertise/HealthCare/HealthCareLawNews/criminalhipaa.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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Gibson has forced the health care industry to reevaluate its
assumptions regarding the applicability of HIPAA and the scope of the
criminal penalties that may be imposed for its violation.
How the DOJ determined that it could prosecute individuals and
not just covered entities under HIPAA is not entirely clear. Assistant
U.S. Attorney Susan Loitz stated that,
this was not a close call, by any means. We felt that Mr.
Gibson clearly violated the HIPAA criminal statute. He
knew what he was doing; he did what he intended to do; he
was caught in the act of improperly disclosing the patient
information; and so we prosecuted him under HIPAA.8
4
Loitz further revealed that "whether Mr. Gibson was or was not a
covered entity under HIPAA was not of great concern to me, although
I note that he is a phlebotomist who was employed by a covered
entity."8 5 So while the DOJ has strongly supported its interpretation of
HIPAA, how it arrived at the determination that criminal penalties can
be assessed against individuals as well as covered entities has yet to be
clearly articulated.
D. AFTER GIBSON: LIABILITY FOR COVERED ENTITIES
Now that the DOJ has voiced its intention to prosecute individuals,
to what extent is a non-covered individual's employer, which may be a
covered entity, be held liable for the actions of an indiscriminate
employee? Attorney Mark Lutes of Epstein Becker & Green P.C.
predicts that providers will not be more susceptible to criminal
prosecution if their employees disclose individually identifiable health
information.86 Attorney Benjamin Butler observes that "there is
nothing to suggest that the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance was itself
implicated in the criminal prosecution. 87
Other legal experts are more cautious, warning that covered
entities need to be vigilant as they may be held liable for the criminal
actions of their non-covered employees. Attorney Michael Bell of
84 Goldberg, supra note 75.
85 Id.
86 Taylor, supra note 77.
87 Butler, supra note 83.
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Mintz Levin in Washington, D.C., speculates that a potential reason
why the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance was not pursued was because it
argued that Gibson acted outside of the scope of his employment and
that the Alliance should not be held responsible. 88 It should be noted
that in investigating Gibson, the DOJ did review the Seattle Cancer
Care Alliance's compliance policies and procedures and was satisfied
that it was not culpable for Gibson's conduct.
89
Attorney Shannon Hartsfield, who regularly advises clients on
HIPAA compliance, indicates that employers could face some degree
of exposure under certain circumstances. She says that, "if a workforce
member violates HIPAA, covered entities could also have exposure,
particularly if they have failed to conduct adequate training or develop
comprehensive privacy protections. A covered entity's risks increase
dramatically if it knew or should have known of an employee's
improper acts." 90 HHS seems to confirm this belief, commenting in the
December 2000 version of the Privacy Rule that at least for civil
enforcement, "a covered entity will generally be responsible for the
actions of its employees such as where the employee discloses
protected health information in violation of the regulation.,
91
Covered entities can take protective measures to avoid legal
responsibility for their employees' transgressions. Such measures
include documentation of HIPAA compliance training for employees
and complete cooperation in any investigation. When asked how
attorneys can further assist their clients to avoid violating HIPAA,
Loitz advised covered entities to
[l]ook at [their] entire procedures with an eye on the
purposes of the law in mind... [and to] deal with problems
as they arise and not . . . let them pass without proper
attention. Learn from your own mistakes and those of others,
and don't delay making corrections to any holes that you
discover in your procedures. And impose appropriate
88 Youngstrom, supra note 73.
89 Goldberg, supra note 75.
90 Hartsfield, supra note 44 3.
91 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462
(Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164), at http://www.hipaadvisory.com/
regs/Regs-inPDF/Final%20Privacy/20Rule.pdf at 601 (last Feb. 21, 2005).
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discipline if you discover that an employee has ignored your
policies and procedures.92
Attorney Brian Annulis suggests that, "what you want to be able to do
when the FBI or the police come to your door is cooperate with them
and show them your compliance plan and how every employee has
documentation of the plan." 93 Annulis further advises that employers
regularly review their HIPAA compliance procedures and make clear
to their employees what is and is not a violation, and what the
penalties are for breaking the rules.
94
E. WATCH FOR A LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE PROSECUTION OF NON-
COVERED INDIVIDUALS
If the Department of Justice continues to impose criminal penalties
on individuals, many predict that it will be subject to a legal challenge.
Attorney Kirk Nahra speculates that, "at some point in the future there
will be a challenge to the government's ability to prosecute individuals
who aren't covered entities for HIPAA violations."95  Attorney
Benjamin Butler agrees, stating that it is unclear how ancthing but a
covered entity can be prosecuted for a criminal violation.9 Butler goes
on to say that the Gibson case did not challenge the authority of the
government to prosecute Gibson individually because it ended in a
guilty plea. However, future cases against individuals may challenge
this practice. 97 Michael Bell calls the DOJ's actions, "a stretch of
authority" and doubts that the action, if legally challenged, would have
been sustained. 9
8
92 Goldberg, supra note 75.
93 Scott, supra note 74.
94 id.
9 5 BNA Interviews WRF Partner Kirk J. Nahra on First HIPAA Privacy Criminal Conviction,
IN THE NEWS (Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP), August 23, 2004, at http://www.wrf.com/
medianews.cfm?sp=news&tp=&industry_id=0&practiceID=0&ID= 1769 (last visited Apr.
25, 2005).
96 Butler, supra note 83.
97 Id.
98 Youngstrom, supra note 73.
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V. HIPAA AND THE PRIVACY RULE'S EFFECT ON PROTECTIONS FOR
GENETIC INFORMATION
A. INTRODUCTION
With the final comments to the HIPAA Privacy Rule in August of
2002, as well as subsequent clarifications by HHS, new questions have
arisen regarding the rule's protection of genetic information.99 These
questions regard the extent to which the Privacy Rule protects genetic
information, who is restricted in their use and access to this
information, and what the limitations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule are.
The public seeks clarification on these issues because they fear that
their privacy will be invaded, and that their genetic information will be
used to discriminate against them for insurance or employment
purposes. 00 HIPAA is the first federal legislation to address directly
the problem of genetic discrimination, but is narrowly limited both in
its protections and covered entities. 10 Thus, it becomes important to
recognize and analyze HIPAA's strengths and weakness in order to
develop future federal protections for genetic information.)12 Lastly,
Iceland recently contracted with a private corporation to construct a
database collection of their citizen's genomes. 0 3  While this
privatization is strongly opposed in Iceland, United States legislators
should closely monitor the results as it could have implications
concerning future genetic privacy and nondiscrimination laws. 104 This
section seeks to illustrate the extent of genetic protection under
HIPAA, implications on future laws, and current events affecting the
future of genetic information in the United States.
99 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, YOUR
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON PRIVACY, at http://hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ (last revised Apr. 18,
2005).
100 Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 669,
673 (2001).
101 HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, DEPT. OF ENERGY, GENETICS PRIVACY AND LEGISLATION, at
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/elsi/legislat.shtml (last modified Oct.
19, 2004).
102 Suter, supra note 100.
103 Oksana Hlodan, For Sale Iceland's Genetic History, ACTIONBIOSCIENCE.ORG (June 2004)
at http://www.actionbioscience.org/genomic/hlodan.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
104 id.
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B. Is GENETIC INFORMATION PROTECTED UNDER THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE?
After the creation of HIPAA, questions persisted as to what
protections would be granted for "individually identifiable health
information," including questions on HIPAA's protections of genetic
information. 10 5 These questions continued for many years until HHS
answered these questions with the issuance of the Privacy Rule.
10 6
This Rule and subsequent HHS publications have definitively
answered that "genetic information" is covered as "protected health
information (PHI)" under the Privacy Rule. 10 7  Being classified as
private health information under HIPAA provides protection for
genetic information as it relates to "medical records and other personal
health information maintained by health care providers, hospitals
health plans and health insurers, and health care clearinghouses.
'10
This means that any genetic information that is "individually
identifiable" pursuant to the Privacy Rule cannot be used or disclosed
by "covered entities" except where the Privacy Rule permits, or as
authorized by the subject of the information. 109
While these protections are a significant step towards federal
protection of genetic information, they are limited in application as
well as scope. HIPAA itself only applies to employer-based and
commercially issued group health insurance.1 1 Its notable protections
for genetic information are:
Prohibits group health plans from using any health
status-related factor, including genetic information, as a
105 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26.
106 id.
107 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 99.
108 HuMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
109 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
110 Stephanie L. Anderson, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms Book
Review, 25 J.LEGAL MED. 119, 128-29 (2004) (feels HIPAA is a step towards federal
protections, but believes that the genetic protections provided for by HIPAA are insufficient
on a federal level).
I I I HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101 (see under Health Insurance Portability Act of
1996).
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basis for denying or limiting eligibility for coverage or
for charging an individual more for coverage
" Limits exclusions for pre-existing conditions in group
health plans to 12 months and prohibits such exclusions
if the individual has been covered previously for that
condition for 12 months or more
" States explicitly that genetic information in the absence
of a current diagnosis of illness shall not be considered a
preexisting condition"
2
Although these protections are substantial, HIPAA does not prohibit
insurance rate increases after genetic testing or prevent genetic
discrimination by employers. 1  Likewise, it fails to prohibit
employers from refusing to offer health coverage as a part of their
benefit package."14
In conjunction with these limited protections are the restrictions on
accessibility and transferability previously mentioned under the
Privacy Rule. Genetic information does not receive special treatment
under this rule; it simply falls within the protections granted to all
private health information. 1 15  Furthermore, if any aspect of that
information is not "individually identifiable" or is "de-identified health
information," then HIPAA would not provide coverage.'
1 6
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule's limited applicability to "covered
entities" is an additional limitation inherent in the Rule. While genetic
information is restricted for "covered entities," any "business
associates" not classified as a "covered entity" are not bound by the
restrictions on genetic information. 117 This is especially relevant in
112id
113 Robert A. Curley Jr. & Lisa M. Caperna, The Brave New World is Here: Privacy Issues
and the Human Genome Project, 70 DEF. CoUNs. J. 22, 29 (2003).
114 HuMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
15 1d.
..
6 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26 ("De-identified information neither identifies nor
provides a reasonable basis to identify an individual.").
117 Tanela J. White & Charlotte A. Hoffman, The Privacy Standards Under The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 709, 724 (2004) ("Covered
entities" are still required to contract with third parties that qualify as "business associates" to
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current times, as there have been instances of genetic information
being sold to private corporations for research."' The Privacy Rule
does require that certain contractual protections be made between
"covered entities" and "business associates," but only "covered
entities" can be held liable for misuse of information by "business
associates."' 19 Additionally, only third parties who do business with
"covered entities" as well as function for or on their behalf will be
considered a "business associate" pursuant to the Privacy Rule.
20
This means that covered entities doing business with third parties who
do not qualify as "business associates" under the Privacy Rule, are not
personally liable for any misuse of that information by the third
party.
121
As previously mentioned, the Privacy rule also permits both
authorized and un-authorized disclosures depending upon the
circumstances surrounding the disclosure. Examples of situations in
which authorization is not required include medical treatment, public
interest, or limited research. 122  In addition to these permitted
"unauthorized disclosures," covered entities are also permitted
authorized disclosures for private health information that is not
otherwise permitted or required by the Privacy Rule.'23 This has
significant implications when dealing with genetic information due to
the massive index of information available about one's entire family
from a single sample of genetic information. 124 It appears that HHS
has addressed this issue in its recent comments to the Privacy Rule. In
these comments HHS indicates that such information would be
ensure protections of PHI. However, it is the covered entity who remains liable in the case of
a violation).
11 See discussion infra Part V.C. on Iceland deCode experience.
1" OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e) (2005).
120 Nancy A. Lawson et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule: An Overview of Compliance Initiatives
and Requirements, 70 DEF. CoUNs. J. 127, 140 (2003).
121 Id.
122 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26, at 4 (provides extensive list on permitted non-
authorized disclosures).
123 Id. at 9.
124 Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Human Rights and Genetic Discrimination, 31 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 377, 378 (2003).
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protected as long as it meets the requirements of the Rule. 125 The
practicality of this is questionable as it would be difficult to determine
who has a greater right to privacy, or who would benefit more from
disclosure versus protection. 126
Issues with applicability continue to persist with business
associates and unclassifiable third party businesses. In addition, there
are continuing concerns about any access to genetic information due to
the scope of information accessible through even limited access. Thus,
although genetic information is definitely protected under the Privacy
Rule, the extent of such protections remains to be seen.
C. APPROACHES TO FUTURE GENETIC PROTECTION LEGISLATION
It is still too early to determine the success and/or shortcomings of
the protections granted by HIPAA and the Privacy Rule. Nonetheless,
the limitations inherent in HIPAA suggest further federal protections
are needed to prevent genetic discrimination in individual insurance
coverage, as well as genetic discrimination in the workplace. 127 These
areas are of great concern because the public fears that "1) insurers
will use genetic information to deny, limit, or cancel insurance policies
or 2) employers will use genetic information against existing workers
or to screen potential employees.' ' 128  Scholars and professionals
continue to interpret the implications of HIPAA, while recognizing a
growin awareness that further protections for genetic information areneeded. 129
1. GENETIC EXCEPTIONALISM
One of the main debates regarding future protections for genetic
information centers on whether genetic protections should treat genetic
information as an exception to, or consistent with other private health
information. 130 As previously discussed, the Privacy Rule treats
125 Anderson, supra note 110, at 129 (citing 65 Fed. Reg. 82462 (Feb. 28, 2000) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164)).
126 Silvers & Stein, supra note 124.
127 HuMAN GENoME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
128 id.
129 Curley & Caperna, supra note 113.
130 Id.
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genetic information consistently with all other private health
information. 13 1  Some scholars and professionals believe that this
approach is the correct aproach to apply to future federal protections
of genetic information. This approach is appealing because it
avoids problems of over and under inclusiveness when laws are
created to protect only certain types of information. 133 Scholars
believe that by creating broad based protections for all private health
information (including genetic information), no class inequities will
result from genetic exceptionalism, which inherently creates
differentiating restrictions between classes of people.
34
2. PRIVACY BASED PROTECTIONS
Regardless of the classification of genetic information, debates
continue on whether future laws should use a privacy based or anti-
discrimination based approach to protect genetic information.'
35
Proponents of the privacy-based approach believe that federal laws
protecting genetic information should be based upon protecting "an
individual's autonomy to control her own destiny."36 The strength of
this approach lies with privacy protections already guaranteed in the
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution.137 In addition, privacy based protections already exist in
twenty-four of the states. A common practice with privacy
legislation is to require consent when accessing a person's genetic
information.139 Thus, where privacy legislation has been enacted, the
131 HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
132 Suter, supra note 100, at 742-43.
3 Id. at 709-15.
134 Id. at 747.
135 Silvers & Stein, supra note 124.
136 id.
137 id.
138 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE GENETIC PRIVACY LAWS, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
139 Silvers & Stein, supra note 124.
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focus is on building trusting relationships where disclosures are
voluntary and remain within the control of the individual.14
0
The strength and weakness with the privacy approach is its isolated
focus on requiring consent to access genetic information. This focus
often fails to adequately consider public policy concerns and the
unique intrusive nature of genetic information. 14 1  Namely, this
approach fails to recognize that a person's genetic information can be
used to determine their entire families' genetic information."' Where
a person gives permission to disclose his or her genetic information,
they would presumably be granting permission for all persons whose
information could be ascertained by the original sample. 4  In this
situation, requiring consent from one person would inadequately
protect the entire family's interest. Furthermore, some scholars believe
that it may be a legal fiction that supervisors, insurers, or employers
permitted to use this information would limit their use to the intended
purpose (i.e. not for employment or insurance premium/coverage
purposes).'"' Thus, fears persist that once access has been granted to
one's genetic information the information could be used later in life in
a discriminatory fashion.145
These privacy concerns have only grown in recent years with
developments in the Human Genome Project. 146 While this was a
landmark achievement, greater knowledge of the human genome also
means greater ability to differentiate and discriminate against
variations identified in the genome. 147 This is an especially relevant
140 Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 737, 812
(2004).
141 Silvers & Stein, supra note 124.
142 Id.
3id.
144 id.
145 id.
146 NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,
PRIVACY OF GENETIC INFORMATION, at http://www.genome.gov/10002336 (last updated Apr.
2005).
147 id.
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topic in Iceland where genome research is being conducted on the
largely homogenous Icelandic population.1
4 8
In December of 1998, the Icelandic parliament passed a bill
ordering the creation of a national database of all Icelandic people's
genetic and personal health information. 149  The parliament then
granted an exclusive contract to create this database to a biomedical
company called deCode genetics. 150 deCode genetics then proceeded
to contract with Hoffman-LaRoche, a pharmaceutical company, in
order to finance certain genetic research. 151  As a result of these
contracts, the Icelandic people's genetic information has been
disclosed to private entities for genealogical research. 152  Recently,
deCode genetics declared that the genealogical database of all
Icelandic citizens was almost finished, and would be published on the
Internet when completed.1
53
This privatization and open access to Iceland's citizens'
genealogical data creates ethical, legal, and business concerns.154 The
Association of Icelanders for Ethics in Science and Medicine
(Mannvernd) strongly opposed its government's actions and sought to
have this Health Sector Database stricken as unconstitutional. 155 This
goal became a reality in November 2003, when the Icelandic Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of the database. 1
56
148 Hlodan, supra note 103.
149 id.
150 Id. FAQs regarding this project are posted at http://www.decode.com.
151 Id. (Research on heart attacks, emphysema and Alzheimer's).
152 id.
153 Hlodan, supra note 103. deCode plans to market its information for a fee to interested
parties, including pharmaceutical and health insurance companies. Id.
154 Id. (See subtopic Why there is opposition to this project).
155AssOCIATION FOR ICELANDERS FOR ETHICS IN SCIENCE AND MEDICINE, MANNVERND, LATEST
NEWS AND ARTICLES, at http://www.mannvernd.is/english/home.html (last updated Apr. 25,
2005).
156 Gudmundsdottir v. State of Iceland, No. 151/2003 (Icelandic Supreme Court Nov. 27,
2003), available at http://www.mannvemd.is/english/lawsuits/
IcelandicSupremeCourtVerdict_151 2003.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
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In this landmark case, the plaintiff sought to prevent the transfer of
data belonging to her deceased father to the Health Sector Database.
57
She argued that this data concerned certain aspects of her own
genome, which gave her a right to refuse consent to include it within
the national database. 158 The Court agreed with the plaintiff and struck
down the HSD Act as unconstitutional. 59 This holding has worldwide
implications as it recognizes a willingness to extend genetic privacy
protections to all those who may have a genetic interest in the
disclosure or access to such information. 1
60
Legislators in the United States would be wise to consider the
events in Iceland as an outline for creating privacy-based legislation.
While the Privacy Rule provides some protections in limited
circumstances, it fails to provide sufficient protections to protect
against situations similar to that in Iceland. The Icelandic government
made deals with private companies who under the Privacy Rule
(assuming it applied in Iceland), would have been considered either
"business associates" or uncovered entities. In the United States,
companies like deCode would be only partially liable for their business
associates' infractions, or not liable at all if these associates were not
considered "business associates" pursuant to the Privacy Rule. 16 1 This
illustrates a disturbing scenario in which private non-covered entity
companies could both disclose and benefit from an individual's
genetic information. 162 While the Iceland situation is a victory for
privacy-based protections, it also illustrates that further protections are
needed when genetic information is disclosed.
157 Id.
158 id.
159 Id.
160 Press Release, Association for Icelanders for Ethics in Science and Medicine, Icelandic
Supreme Court's Nov. 27, 2003 Decision at http://www.mannvernd.is/english/
lawsuits/MannvemdPressRelease SupremeCourt.html (last visited February 20, 2005).
161 White & Hoffman, supra note 117, at 731-32.
162 Hlodan, supra note 103 (In Iceland, deCode has a monopoly on the genetic data and is
permitted to commercialize the data for twelve years.).
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3. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
The privacy based approach to genetic information protections
focuses on trusting relationships and requiring consent for
disclosures.' However, the anti-discrimination model assumes that
the privacy model will be unsuccessful, and provides regulations for
how this information should and should not be used.1 64 To date, there
has been no specific federal genetic nondiscrimination legislation
enacted. 165  While HIPAA directly addresses certain genetic
discrimination practices, it was not created for the sole purpose of
preventing genetic discrimination. 66  Therefore, existing
nondiscrimination laws have occasionally been interpreted to provide
protections against genetic discrimination.
67
The Americans with Disabilities Act 168 is one of the commonly
argued laws granting protections against genetic discrimination. 169
The ADA does not directly prohibit genetic discrimination, but it does
provide "some protections for disability related discrimination in the
workplace."' 170  Many have argued that this means the ADA would
cover disability discrimination based upon a genetic condition.' 7' This
argument has, however, been called into doubt by a United States
Supreme Court decision. 72  In Bragdon v. Abbott, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent suggested that he may be reluctant to define
individuals with genetic alterations as disabled pursuant to ADA. 173
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have been consistent with this
163 Suter, supra note 140.
16 Silvers & Stein, supra note 124, at 379.
165 HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
'66 45 C.F.R §§ 160, 162, 164 (2005).
167 HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
16'42 U.S.C.A. § 12101.
169 id.
170 Curley & Caperna, supra note 113, at 30.
171 Id.
172 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 657-62 (1998).
173 Curley & Caperna, supra note 113. See also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657.
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opinion and have further limited the protected class under the ADA as
a matter of policy.
174
Absent the ADA and HIPAA's restrictions on genetic
discrimination, there appears to be a lack of broad anti-discrimination
laws on the federal level. 175 HIPAA and its Privacy Rule provide a
good example of a mixture of privacy and anti-discrimination based
laws, but is insufficient to provide a national standard for medical
and/or genetic privacy. 176 Due to this lack of federal protections for
genetic information, U.S. citizens are left to their individual state's
privacy laws for protection from invasion of privacy and genetic
discrimination. 177
D. THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS
In 2001, legislation was introduced by Senator Tom Daschle and
House Representative Louise Slaughter, which would provide
protection for genetic information that was not otherwise provided for
by HIPAA. 178  The foundation of this act was established after the
February 8, 2000 executive order prohibiting federal employers from
considering genetic information in employment decisions.179 The act
entitled "Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and
Employment Act," prohibits insurers from using protected genetic
information to make decisions about eligibility for group or individual
health plans or to make premium adjustments in light of such
information.10 Additional protections include restrictions on insurers'
access to private genetic information, as well as strict prohibitions on
genetic discrimination in employment situations.181 It appears that this
174 Sutton v. Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
175 HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, supra note 101.
176 Anderson, supra note 110.
177 Id. States' varying protections concerning genetic information will be discussed more
thoroughly in the subsequent section. See discussion infra Part VI.
171 CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CONGRESS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE STATUS OF MAJOR LEGISLATION, at http://www.aaas.org/spp/cstc/
stc/status.htm (last updated Feb. 28, 2001).
179 Curley & Caperna, supra note 113, at 30.
180 Suter, supra note 100, at 697.
181 Id.
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legislation would patch many of the holes in the current protections,
while meeting the twin goals of protecting individual privacy and
prohibiting genetic discrimination. However, this legislation continues
to be considered in committee while attempts are made to agree on its
provisions. 1
82
Similarly, numerous genetic nondiscrimination and privacy bills
have been introduced to Congress, but continue to be considered in
Congressional committees. 83 While these bills are being refined and
eliminated, individuals are forced to rely on limited HIPAA
protections as well as their own state laws. This state dependent
scheme provides varied genetic coverage and protections, but
generally prohibits employers from requiring workers and agplicants
to undergo genetic testing as a condition of employment. This
provides confusion from state to state, but individuals can find their
states' genetic privacy laws on the National Conference of
Legislatures website.
185
There is no definitive answer as to what future federal protections
will be granted for genetic information. Until pending legislative
protections are enacted by Congress, individuals must rely on the
existing federal protections under HIPAA, in addition to their home
state's protections
E. CONCLUSION
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule have ensured specific privacy
protections for an individual's genetic information, while also
federally barring genetic discrimination with group insurance
practices. These protections, though limited, have provided legislators
with invaluable experience in developing the proper approach to
genetic privacy and nondiscrimination. It appears that future
182 Release, Senator Tom Daschle, Statement by Leader Daschle on Help Committee
Reporting out the Genetic Nondiscrimination Bill (May 21, 2003) (regarding the status of the
bill), at http://democrats.senate.gov/-dpc/releases/2003522A49.htil (last visited Apr. 25,
2005).
183 HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, 108TH CONGRESS HOUSE BILLS, at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/newsletter-ur12305/newsletter-url.htm (last visited Apr. 25,
2005); HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, 108TH CONGRESS SENATE BILLS, at http://healthprivacy.org/
newsletter-ur12305/newsletter-url.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
184 HUMAN GENoME PROGRAM, supra note 101 (see State Policy History).
185 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 138.
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legislation should ensure an individual's right to privacy, while
guaranteeing protections if that privacy is breached. Additionally,
current events in Iceland illustrate valid concerns with the use of
genetic information. Thus, using the strengths of HIPPA and the
Privacy Rule, and correcting their weaknesses, further federal
protections for genetic information can become a reality.
VI. STATE COMPLIANCE AND THE DISPARITY IN STATE PRIVACY LAW
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the largest areas of confusion regarding HIPAA and the
Privacy Rule is how these statutes interact with state laws concerning
privacy. 186  However, this issue has become less confusing as the
Department of Health and Human Services has recently published
FAQs and a Summary of the Privacy Rule on its website.18 7
Generally, the Privacy Rule preempts all conflicting state laws, unless
the state law requires stricter privacy restrictions than the Privacy
Rule.' 88 Although this seems like a simple test, problems continue as
various exceptions to the rule complicate compliance.' 89 Additional
difficulties lie in attempting to comply with various state and federal
laws, without endangering compliance with the Privacy Rule. Where
state law governs, variations in state protections make it extremely
difficult to determine what privacy laws govern. This confusion,
combined with a lack of federal support, demands federal attention to
remedy disparate protections amongst the states. Thus, where HIPAA
fails to preempt state law, federal legislation is needed to provide
uniform protection.
B. PRE-EMPTION POLICY
After the August 14, 2003 deadline for compliance with the
Privacy Rule, states and "covered entities" have experienced
186 Steve Fox & Rebekah A.Z. Monson, Interaction of HIPAA with State and Other Federal
Laws, HIPAA/LAW: LEGAL Q/A (Phoenix Health Systems, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 2004, at
http://www.hipaadvisory.com/action/legalqa/hipaalaw.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
18' OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 99; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26.
188 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 26 (citing 45 C.F.R § 160.203 2005)).
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difficulties in determining their compliance with the Rule. 190 The
general policy established in the Privacy Rule is that "State laws that
are contrary to the Privacy Rule are preempted by the federal
requirement, which means that the federal requirements will apply.'
9
'
HHS further defines "contrary" laws, as those laws which are
impossible to comply with, without hindering an entity's ability to
comply with HIPAA or some purpose or objective of HIPAA. 192 The
Privacy Rule is simply meant to establish a uniform "floor" of
protection for protected health information. 19
3
Nonetheless, the Privacy Rule provides exceptions to this
preemption policy for contrary state laws that: 1) relate to the privacy
of the individually identifiable information and provide greater
privacy protections or privacy rights with respect to such information,
2) "provide for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or
death," or for public surveillance, investigation, or intervention, or 3)
require certain health plan reporting. 4  In addition to these
exceptions, the Privacy Rule provides additional exceptions for state
laws where specific situations or public interests are involved.19
5
The problem with this standard is that "covered entities" are still
confused as to whether their state laws are more stringent than the
HIPAA Privacy Rule. 196 HHS has again attempted to clarify this issue
by defining factors for an entity to consider when determining whether
their state law preempts the Privacy Rule. These factors are:
" Whether disclosure or use are restricted when otherwise
allowed under the Privacy Rule;
" Whether state restrictions limiting access to PHI provide
greater restrictions than the Privacy Rule;
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 id.
193 HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND POLICY
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 34 (2002), at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/RegSummary2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
194id
195 Id.
196 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 99.
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* Whether state laws require stricter form or substance
when obtaining legal permission for disclosures of
identifiable health information, or
* Whether any additional protections are granted to an
individual, not otherwise available under the Privacy
Rule.
197
In addition to these and other clarifications published by HHS,
many state bar and other associations provide HIPAA preemption
matrices in order to assist covered entities to achieve compliance.'
98
Although this preemption analysis can be challenging, professionals
believe that a compliant blending individual state, HIPAA, and other
privacy laws is possible. 1
99
C. EXAMPLES AND DIFFERENCES IN STATE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
When a state's privacy law preempts the Privacy Rule, or privacy
issues do not fall within the purview of the Rule, individuals must rely
solely on their state's privacy protections. 20 0 However, every state has
varying privacy protections depending upon the use and access to
private information.20 1  Thus, if both the state and HIPAA fail to
provide protection, a person may find himself or herself without
certain privacy protections.
This varying degree of protection is illustrated by the states' wide
range of genetic privacy laws. Most states have privacy laws that treat
genetic information separately from other private health information,
e.g., genetic exceptionalism. 2  Washington is the only state that treats
197 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2005).
198 PHOENIX HEALTH SYSTEMS, STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS AND PREEMPTION
ANALYSES, at http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/StateLaws.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005)
(Ohio and Washington Matrices).
199 Fox, supra note 185.
200 White & Hoffman, supra note 117, at 727.
201 HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, STATE HEALTH PRIVACY LAWS (2d ed. 2002) (List privacy laws
for all fifty states), available at http://www.healthprivacy.org/info-url-nocat2304/info-
urlnocat.htm (Last viewed February 20, 2005).
202 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 138.
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genetic information the same as all other protected health
information. 20 3  The Privacy Rule follows a similar approach in
treating genetic information no differently than other private health
information.
Most state privacy laws prevent certain parties from accessing or
using private information in certain capacities. 204 Twenty-four states
require informed consent to disclose genetic information, while Rhode
Island and Washington have an additional requirement of written
authorization to disclose the same information.20 5  Furthermore,
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana classify genetic
information as property of the individual.20 6 This classification of
genetic information is significant, because it completely changes the
justification for the protections. Most privacy laws focus on protecting
personal autonomy and the right to privacy. States creating this
property right, however, can argue for privacy protections under the
guise of property law.
Privacy laws are also enforced in varying degrees depending on the
state. Eighteen states have criminal penalties civil penalties, or both,
for violations of their genetic privacy laws.2 °7 The remaining states
create no specific penalty for similar violations.20 8 This is a significant
difference that could create inequities for the same violations in
different states.
State genetic privacy laws also vary protections in employment
situations. Thirty-two states currently enforce genetic
nondiscrimination laws, but differ in the extent of their protections. 0 9
Some states strictly prohibit genetic testing, while others simply
restrict an employer's access to genetic information. 210  For the
moment, employment is an area where an individual is largely
203 Id.
2 04 id.
205 id.
206 id.
207 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 138.
208 id.
209 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE GENETICS EMPLOYMENT LAWS, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
2 10 id.
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dependent on the law of his or her state to provide protections against
genetic discrimination. 21' This is subiect to change if pending federal
employment protections are enacted.
In situations where HIPAA and the Privacy Rule do not apply nor
preempt state law, privacy protections for genetic information may
vary when used in health insurance. "These laws may restrict health
insurers from engaging in certain activities, including using genetic
information to determine eligibility or set premiums, requiring genetic
testing of applicants, or disclosing genetic information without
consent. '' 213  It is important to note, that while HIPAA provides
coverage for employer-sponsored health benefit plans, individuals
must still rely on state protections for genetic information.
2 14
These examples illustrate the great disparity between existing
genetic privacy laws. Due to this disparity in privacy protections, U.S.
citizens are at risk of receiving various degrees of genetic privacy
protections as well as varying penalties for similar violations. This
problem of varying protections is not limited to genetic information,
but is ubiquitous throughout state privacy law.215  HIPAA has
achieved its goal of creating a "floor" of specific privacy protections in
the insurance arena. These protections, however, must now be
expanded in order to address disparities in state laws dealing with
nondiscrimination and privacy.
D. CoNcLusIoN
The first dilemma facing "covered entities" under the Privacy Rule
is determining whether the Privacy Rule preempts their state law. This
is a confusing examination of state and federal law, but has becomes
easier with guidance from HHS and professionals, who now have
experience after the 2003 compliance deadline. As this preemption
211 id
212 HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, STATE HEALTH PRIVACY LAWS (2d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/newsletter-ur12305/newsletter-url.htm (Last viewed May 8,
2005).
2 13 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE GENETICS AND HEALTH INSURANCE
STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/
ndishlth.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
215 HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 201.
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policy becomes clearer, however, entities are faced with the reality of
varying privacy protections between states. Nowhere is this more
noticeable than with the great disparity of genetic information
protections amongst the states. Pending federal legislation seeks to
provide greater and more uniform privacy protections to remedy these
disparities. In the meantime, for better or worse, United States citizens
must rely on their state's privacy protections, supplemented by a
"floor" of entity-limited privacy protections under the Privacy Rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the release of the Privacy Rule, numerous questions have
arisen concerning its scope, interpretation, and enforceability. Many
question whether the Privacy Rule is being enforced, as OCR has not
assessed any civil monetary penalties for a violation, even though it
has received thousands of complaints. While enforcement seemed
sluggish in 2004, due in part to OCR's focus on voluntary compliance
and the low quality of some of the complaints, it is likely to become
more vigorous in the near future, as people become more educated
about the Rule and as OCR investigations progress through the
enforcement pipeline.
There is also a looming question of whether the Privacy Rule may
properly be enforced against individuals as it was in the Gibson case.
The DOJ's choice to prosecute Gibson caused a ripple in the health
care industry, and it is likely to be challenged in the near future.
Another prominent question is the extent of protection the Privacy
Rule provides for an individual's genetic information. It appears that
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule cover such information, but the
protection is limited. How to protect genetic information will likely
become a hotly debated issue as future legislation defines the scope of
such protection.
In addition, covered entities continue to struggle with the challenge
of determining whether the Privacy Rule preempts their state laws, and
what protections these laws guarantee. This assessment will become
easier in 2005 as HHS, pending legislation, and the courts continue to
provide guidance.
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